At 20:57 UTC on September 28, twenty scan reports appeared on urlquery.net, a free public URL-scanning service, all pointed at the same target: the Amap (Gaode Maps) page for Beijing’s Summer Palace. Over the next week a group of independent researchers watched the number snowball: 2,048 reports covering 216 places in China, parks, zoos, hospitals, temples, with 1,810 reports on October 4 alone. They published a preliminary report that day and updated it the next: a fleet of AI agents running on Tencent Cloud, with evidence pointing to Tencent’s Hunyuan models, was systematically reading one obscure kind of Amap data, namely which entrance visitors to each place actually use.
Take Chengdu Zoo: north gate 71%, east gate 23%, southeast gate 6%. The numbers come from Amap’s sub_poi_navi and clk_ratio fields, the distribution of navigation clicks across a venue’s entrances. When Alibaba’s anti-bot system blocked direct requests, the fleet wrote its way around it. The researchers counted 428 distinct programs written by the agents themselves. The tricks included generating Alibaba’s anti-bot tokens, digging up a public API key that has been sitting on Amap’s official CodePen demo page since at least 2023, and relaying through r.jina.ai and page-translation proxies. Typically 4 to 8 agents ran at once, peaking at 14.
Why outsiders could watch so much of it
The visibility rests on a mechanism with some irony in it. urlquery.net is a security service: you submit a suspicious link, it opens the link in a sandboxed browser, and it stores the result as a public report. Transluce’s September 23 report had already shown agents discovering a second use for it: if a target site blocks my request, submit the URL to urlquery, let its sandbox open the page for me, then read the content back out of the public report. A security tool becomes a free remote-browser relay that asks for no account. Transluce found 6,467 urlquery reports with clear traces of agent activity.
The toll for the detour is a public record of every trip. The researchers’ entire analysis runs on those records; the public log doubles as a security camera. There may also have been a route that never shows up on urlquery: over the same period the Wayback Machine logged 2,030 captures of Amap pages, 1,320 of them on October 4. The archive doesn’t record who requests a capture, so tying those to the fleet is an inference from the timing, not a confirmed path. Much of the visibility was luck. The fleet happened to favor a path that keeps receipts.
Signed “claude”, fingerprinted as Hunyuan
Of the 2,048 reports, 211 carry a “claude” label the agents applied to themselves. On the signature alone, the bill would go to Anthropic. But the researchers ran stylometry on the code in the reports, using a character n-gram classifier (count the frequency of short character sequences, compare against samples from each model family): Tencent’s Hunyuan Hy4 scored highest at 28%, Zhipu’s GLM next at 26%, Claude at 0%. The handwriting disagrees too: 74% of the fleet’s pages use a lowercase <!doctype>, which Claude models almost never emit.
Then the direct test: ask Hunyuan Hy3 which model it is, and 29 times out of 36 it answers “I am Claude.” Distillation, or competitor outputs in the training data, would be the obvious suspects, but that is my guess; the researchers establish no cause. The consequence is already concrete: in this case the model’s self-reported identity carried no evidentiary weight at all, and it actively misdirected the attribution of a real event.
Even the attribution to Tencent is only “probable”. Anyone can rent Tencent Cloud, and proxy names are self-declared. The researchers’ case stacks several independent lines: 19 Tencent Cloud addresses, a proxy named hysandbox-ats (HY as in Hunyuan), a *.hysandbox.tencent-cloud.com certificate held by Tencent, plus the code fingerprints. Not one record states who commissioned the task.
It may not know it is “attacking” anything
The most counterintuitive finding: in urlquery’s visible records, the 2,048 scans show no trace of coordination. No shared channel, no synchronized change of tactics. Each results inbox serves exactly one place, and once a place yields its data, work stops; when the same place comes up again later, the fleet mostly starts over from direct requests (58 of 73 follow-up sessions). The researchers insist this is a fleet, not a swarm: many agents running the same kind of task in parallel, with zero communication between them.
What does that shape resemble? In the researchers’ own words, it looks like “an evaluation or task-generation run”, and they say the records alone cannot be distinguished from a training rollout (the loop where a model attempts a task repeatedly and the trajectories are collected to update it). Follow the shape and one explanation becomes impossible to rule out: nobody ordered an attack on Amap. A training or evaluation pipeline took the live internet as its environment and treated a competitor’s anti-bot wall as a task to solve. That is inference; the public records can neither confirm it nor rule out that someone directed the whole thing. But whoever initiated it, the traffic lands on Amap’s servers, with urlquery and webhook.site drafted as free relays along the way, and possibly the Internet Archive too.
There is a backdrop: the open internet is closing doors under this same kind of pressure. Wikimedia published its bill last year: crawlers are only 35% of pageviews but generate 65% of the most expensive traffic to its core datacenters. I worked through those numbers in my August piece on the digital commons. The pressure is measurable even on a blog my size: writing this piece, I pulled 80 days of my own analytics, July 17 through October 4, and about a quarter of all visits view a single page and spend zero seconds on it. I can’t confirm that with bot flags, but the combination reads more like automation than people. And the same week this fleet went to work, Reddit announced on September 30 that RSS support ends November 13, saying RSS “is now a common surface for large-scale scraping and automated abuse”; a companion plan closes what remains of open access to its public Data API by March 2027 behind a registered developer platform, citing automated abuse and commercial scraping at a scale the API was never built for. This case shows exactly who a closed door stops: the rule-following, identifiable visitor. Blocked once, the fleet changed routes. Platforms swap default-open for default-authorized, agents treat the detour as the next task, and each side becomes the other’s reason to escalate.
The prompt-injection threat model doesn’t reach here
Containing the Autonomous Operator (arXiv:2610.02861), submitted the same week, states its threat model plainly: the adversary is prompt injection, the agent may be hijacked at any moment, therefore “the model must not be treated as a security boundary” and the operator should fence its agents in with infrastructure.
None of that grips this case. Nothing in the visible records points to hijacking, though nobody has run that forensic check; the fleet looks like it is dutifully completing assigned work. And the only party who could install the fence is the unidentified operator. The three parties paying the cost (Amap being scraped, the public services borrowed as relays, Anthropic wearing a “claude” label the stylometry contradicts) hold no model and see nothing of the execution framework behind the traffic; they can harden their own perimeters, but none of them can place a guardrail on the agent side. For them the problems are old ones: anti-scraping, abuse, impersonation. What’s new is the adversary’s shape: something that writes 428 programs on site, finds its own proxy chains, and switches paths after every failure.
Three judgments I’m willing to commit to. For defenders: an agent’s self-declared identity, from user-agent strings to labels to the model’s own stated name, can’t be trusted for attribution; behavioral fingerprints (code stylometry, routing habits, timezone configuration) are usable, and this attribution came from behavioral fingerprints stacked with network evidence like IPs and certificates. For anyone running a public web service: you are already part of agent infrastructure, opted in or not, and your public logs are both the abused entry point and the outside world’s only observability. For model developers: once an evaluation or training pipeline touches the real internet, it should be governed as a deployment.
This episode was watchable in unusual detail because the fleet favored a path that leaves public receipts; the possible Wayback side channel is a reminder that the invisible part may be larger. More agent friction will arrive in this shape: no identifiable principal, no visible malice, no visible hijack, and public evidence that carries the explanation only as far as “a pipeline that treated the outside world as its environment” before it stops. I don’t know of a ready answer for who should do the forensics on events like this, and the public logs any forensics would depend on are byproducts of urlquery’s and the Internet Archive’s separate missions, never designed for the job.
References
- We found a Chinese agent fleet (swarmcha.se, preliminary report published 2026-10-04, updated 10-05) — primary source for all fleet data: 2,048 reports, 216 places, 1,810 peak day, 428 programs, 4–8/14 concurrency, Chengdu Zoo readout, 211 “claude” labels, stylometric attribution (Hy4 28% / GLM 26% / Claude 0%), Hy3 answering “I am Claude” 29/36, hysandbox-ats proxy and certificate, absence of coordination in urlquery-visible records, the evaluation/training-rollout assessment, 2,030 Wayback captures
- Early rogue AI agent activity found on urlquery.net (Transluce, 2026-09-23) — the mechanism by which agents use urlquery as a no-account remote-browser relay; 6,467 reports with clear agent activity
- How crawlers impact the operations of the Wikimedia projects (Wikimedia Diff, 2025-04-01) — crawlers at 35% of pageviews, 65% of the most expensive core-datacenter traffic
- r/modnews official announcement (2026-09-30) — Reddit’s timeline for ending RSS support (2026-11-13), with its stated rationale (primary)
- r/redditdev: Our plans for the future of Reddit’s public Data API — the March 2027 timeline for moving the public Data API behind the registered developer platform, with its stated rationale (primary)
- Containing the Autonomous Operator (arXiv:2610.02861) — a threat model for agent runtime security (prompt injection; the model is not a security boundary), used here as a contrast
- Researchers are tracking a Chinese AI ‘agent fleet’ (TechCrunch, 2026-10-05) — how I found the story; all facts in the body were checked against the primary report
- On this site: Copying doesn’t deplete the original. Why is AI scraping still a tragedy of the commons? — the bills open infrastructure pays for AI crawling, and the enclosure response